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FISCAL PARADISE:
FOREIGN TAX HAVENS AND AMERICAN RJSINESS
The offshore tax haven affiliates of Arerican corporations aint for
ixcre than a quarter of US foreign investnat, an nearly a third of the
foreign profits of US fins. This paper analyzes the origins of this tax
haven activity arti its iiuplicat ions for the US ard foreign governments.
Based on the behavior of US fins in 1982, it aççears that Anurican cniipanies
report extraordinarily hi profit rates on both their real ard their
financial investments in tax havens. We calculate fran this behavior that
the tax rate that maxinizes tax revenue for a typical haven is arcwd 6%.
The revenue i.nçlicat ions for the US are ucre ctrplicated, since tax havens
may ultimately enhance the ability of the US goverruient to tax the foreign
earnins of American conipanies.
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Competition in the global economy has two faces: whereas US multinationals must vie
with Foreign firms in worldwide markets, they often benefit from their ability to invest in foreign
locations. Eager for the revenue and employment that American firms can provide, many foreign
governments actively try to lure US business to their shores. In response. American firms now
locate a significant and growing part of their foreign operations in tax havens, a group of countries
with unusually tow tax rates that has been extremely successful at attracting US business.
From the standpoint of US tax policy, the widespread use of tax havens threatens the
long-un sustainability of the US domestic tax base, since US multinational corporations may be
able to shift some of their domestic income to low-tax offshore jurisdictions. At the same time,
tax haven profits represent the richest possible foreign source of US tax revenue, since they
generate few foreign tax credits to offset US tax due upon repatriation. In order to assess net
impact of tax haven countries on US companies and the US government, we analyze the
incentives created by their low tax rates and the ways in which American firms respond to those
incentives.
Specifically, we are concerned with Four issues involving tax havens. The first is whether
US firms report abnormally high profit rates in low-tax foreign jurisdictions. The second is the
extent to which the low tax rates available in tax havens explain the observed local levels of US
firms' operations and their total reported earnings. The third issue concerns the behavior of
governments: can we explain the decisions of tax havens to offer very low tax rates on the basis
of revenue maximization or other considerations? And the fourth issue is the impact of tax havens
on the US Treasury: what revenue does the US collect from American corporations in tax havens,
and what would be the likely consequences for the US if a tax haven were to raise its tax rate?2
We identify 41 countries and regions as tax havens for the purposes of US businesses.'
Their combined population amounts to only 30 million (1.2% of the western world's population)
and they produce only 3.0% or the West's GDP.2 Table 1 presents some characteristics of their
economies, along with detail on local US corporate operations. In analyzing the tax haven
operations of American business, we rely on US Commerce Department data for 1982!
There are several ways to gauge the magnitude of business operations; by one measure,
gross assets, havens account for over one-quarter ($359 billion) of the $1.35 trillion of corporate
activity conducted worldwide by the overseas affiliates of American firms (Table 1, Column 3).
This amount substantially exceeds American direct investment in all of (non-haven) continental
Europe. Since gross assets exclude liabilities, it is also enlightening to consider the stock of US
equity in tax havens (Table 1, Column 4). By the equity measure, the tax havens account for a
somewhat smaller share of foreign direct investment, 21 %.' Yet in terms or net income. tax haven
affiliates' share is larger than their asset share: 30.8% ($11.1 billion) of a worldwide total of $36.0
billion.
Since assets, equity and income include purely financial transactions, they may not
provide a clear image of how much physical activity takes place in tax haven countries. An
'Appendix A contains a complete listing and a description of our process of identifying tax
havens.
2For our purposes, West' excludes Socialist countries, Sub-Saharan Africa (except
Southern Africa), and oil exporters.
3Our calculations are based on data from the US Department of Commerce' 1982
comprehensive "Benchmark Survey' of us foreign direct investment, the most current available
source of data on the operations and tax liabilities of US firms. The companion publication US
Direct Investment Abroad (US Department of Commerce, 1985) contains only a small part of
the data which are essential for our analysis. However, the Department's Bureau of Economic
Analysis provided us with aggregate figures calculated from proprietary benchmark survey
data. A full description of the data and of variable definitions appears in Appendix A.
It would, of course, be even more informative to follow the evolution of tax laws and
business responses over time, but detailed information or the type needed are simply not
available on anything like a consistent basis. Unfortunately, 1982 was a recession year around
the world and may in some instances suggest conclusions that are sensitive to business cycle
conditions.
'Unfortunately, there exists rio measure of the 'equity" of banking affiliates, and this
omission is likely to understate the US-owned capital stock in offshore banking centers.3
alternative is to consider the employment and 'property, plant, and equipment"5 ci US
corporations' foreign affiliates, According to these measures, US alfiliates' employment and
tangible capital in tax havens appear to be commensurate with the countries' share in world GDP.
Columns 6 and 7 ci Table 1 reveal that, out of 6.82 million overseas employees of US affiliates!
only 0.29 million (4.3%) work in tax haven affiliates. Similarly, while the property, plant, and
equipment of US foreign affiliates totals $227.9 billion worldwide, only $9.6 billion (4.2%) is located
in havens.
The economies of the 41 tax havens differ considerably. For this reason, it is instructive
to distinguish the several relatively large tax havens from the many small havens. Together the
seven tax havens with populations in excess oil million (Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia. Lebanon,
Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) account for 80% ci total tax haven population and 89% of
tax haven GOP. They appear to be the locus ci most of the physical activity undertaken by US
haven affiliates, much ci it in the non-financial sectors.
The remaining havens are tiny, their median 1982 population only 200,000 inhabitants.
Nonetheless, as Table 1 indicates, these dot-sized countries still account for about 60% ci the
assets, equity and net income in tax havens, We refer to these smaller havens as tots,' and to
the larger havens as the "Big-7."
Table 2 describes the US business activity in the nine havens with largest number of US
affiliates and greatest amount of 1982 net income of US ioreign affiliates: among the Big-7
countries, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, and Panama are included; four Dots also
appear: Bermuda, the Netherlands Antilles, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands. US firms in
each of these nine countries earned net income in 1982 between $600 million and $2 billion.
There was considerable variation in the physical presences of American lirrns: they employed more
5U.S. data on overseas 'property, plant and equipment' are available only for non-bank
affiliates of non-bank parents. While this omission is unfortunate, it should be noted that even
in tax havens these affiliates account in aggregate Icr 98.5% of net income and 92.5% ci
employment.4
than 25,000 people in each of the five Big-7 countries shown in Table 2, while US employment in
the Dots nowhere exceeded 8,500.
The sketchy available evidence suggests that US firms have dramatically increased their
use of tax havens in recent years. The US Department of Commerce conducted earlier
benchmark surveys in 1966 and 1977. While the 1966 data are not sufficiently complete to allow
comparison, the 1977 data are fully comparable to data from 1982. Table 3 contrasts US direct
foreign investment in 1977 and 1982: as measured by assets, tax haven affiliates have more than
doubled their share of the US-owned stock of Foreign capital in these five years; and in the
smallest tax havens, affiliates' assets have expanded Four-fold,6 Yet their share of the overseas
employment of US affiliates has remained essentially constant.
Section 2 of this paper explores in detail the means by which US multinational firms can
exploit tax havens to maximize their after-tax profits. Section 3 examines the behavior of US
multinationals in 1982, which appears to be consistent with predicted behavior: holding other
factors constant, their earnings are extremely sensitive to the low tax rates available in havens.
Section 4 then considers the tax rate policy decisions of foreign governments, finding that very
low rates (about 5%) represent revenue-maximizing choices for very small countries. Section 5
offers a brief analysis of US policy toward Foreign tax havens, raising the possibility that, despite
appearances, the presence of foreign tax havens enhances the US Treasury's ability to collect
revenue from US firms' Foreign-source income. Section 6 concludes.
6This phenomenon is not unique to the US: among capital-exporting countries as a whole.
the very limited data seem to support the view that multinationals all over the world are rapidly
increasing their use of tax havens. OECD (1987) records aggregate foreigp direct investment
by industrial countries in all non-oil-exporting developing host countries. From these data, we
estimate the real growth rate of the stock of direct investment in developing countries to
average 1.3 percent per year during the decade of 1971 to 1981. In contrast, this growth rate
averages 7,8 percent per year for the Big-7 tax havens. Unfortunately, OECD (1987) does not
measure Fol in a manner consistent with the Benchmark Survey. These differences imply that
these data may be no more than suggestive of trends in total tax haven investment.5
Ii. US Firms and the Lure of Low Tax Rates
US firms have many incentives to operate in tax havens, not the least of which are their
refreshingly low tax rates. Since the rules concerning international taxation are quite complicated
and can in some cases vitiate the advantages of earning profits in low-tax foreign jurisdictions, It
is necessary to understand the mechanics of the tax system in order to appreciate the usefulness
of tax havens to American firms,
THE SYSTEM'
The US taxes income on a "residence' basis, meaning that American corporations and
individuals owe taxes to the US government on all of their worldwide income, whether earned in
the US or not. Since foreign profits are usually taxed in host countries, US law provides a foreign
Lax credit for income taxes (and related taxes) paid to loreign governments in order to avoid
subjecung American multinationals to double taxation.With the foreign tax credit, a US
corporation that earns $100 in a foreign country with a 15% tax rate (and a Foreign tax obligation
of $15) pays only $19 to the US government, since its US corporate tax liability of $34 (34% of
$100) is reduced to $19 by the foreign tax credit of $15. The foreign tax credit Is, however, limited
to US tax liability on foreign Income; if, in the example, the foreign tax rate were 50%, then the lirm
pays $50 to the foreign government but its US foreign tax credit is limited to $34. American
corporations calculate their foreign tax credits on a worldwide basis, so that all foreign income and
foreign taxes paid are added together in the computation of the foreign tax credit limit. Hence a
US firm receives a full tax credit for its foreign taxes paid only when it is in a "deficit credit"
position, i.e., when its average foreign tax rate is less than its tax rate on domestic operations.
'This brief description of the tax system is excerpted from Hines (1989).6
A firm has "excess credits" if its available foreign tax credits exceed US tax liability on Its foreign
income.B
Deferral of US taxation of certain foreign earnings is another important feature ci the US
international tax system. A US parent firm is taxed on its subsidiaries" Foreign income only when
returned ("repatriated") to the parent corporation, and receives "indirect" Foreign tax credits
("deemed-paid credits') for foreign income taxes paid (by the subsidiaries) on income
subsequently received as dividends. This type of deferral is available only to foreign operations
that are separately incorporated in foreign countries ("subsidiaries" oF the parent) and not to
consolidated ('branch") operations.9 The US government taxes branch proFits as they are earned,
just as it would profits earned within the United States Hence, choosing to organize a foreign
operation as a branch means that the parent US Urm forgoes the opportunity of deferring US taxes
on Foreign income."'
The deferral of US taxation may create incentives For firms to delay repatriating dividends
from their foreign subsidiaries. In 1962. Congress enacted the 'Subpart F" provisions in part to
prevent indeFinite deferral of US tax liabiUty on income earned abroad that is continually reinvested
merely in order to escape US taxes. Subpart F rules apply to controlled foreign corporations
(CFCs), which are foreign corporations owned at least 50% by US persons holding stakes of at
least 10% each. The Subpart F rules treat a CFC's passive income (and income invested in US
property) as ii it were distributed to its American owners, and so it is subject to immediate US
6Furthermore, income is broken into different functional 'baskets" in the calculation ci
applicable credits and limits. In order to qualify for the foreign tax credit, firms must own at
least 10 percent of a foreign affiliate and only those taxes that qualify as income taxesare creditabla
9The nomenclature is rather involved. All foreign operations lakeplace through affiliates;
those that are separately incorporated are subsidiaries. Majority ownership can bevery
important From a legal, economic, and data reporting standpoint; much of the U.S. Department
of Commerce data on Foreign operations of U.S. multinationals is reported formajority-owned
foreign affiliates, without distinguishing branches from subsidiaries. Controlled foreign
corporations are the subset of subsidiaries that meet the ownership requirements described in
the text; they need not be (though they usually are) majority-owned by a singleparent.
"'On the other hand, organizing as a branch permits the investor to deductforeign branch
losses from the firm's US income, and may (in some cases) reduce the burden of foreign
regulations7
taxation.11 CFCs that reinvest their earnings in active foreign businesses avoid the Subpart F
restrictions and can continue to defer US tax liability on those earnings. The Tax Reform Act or
1986 further expands the coverage of Subpart F, and also makes currently taxable the income of
American investors in passive Foreign investment companies that do not qualify as CFCs because
they do not meet the 50% ownership rule.
There are several ways in which subsidiaries repatriate their profits. Payment of dMdends
From a subsidiary to its shareholding parent is the most common, and offers the advantage that
the parent receives an indirect Foreign tax credit For the foreign taxes that were paid on the Income
that generated the dividend. For subsidiaries that borrow funds from their parent corporations,
the interest and principal payments represent Flows back to the United States. The repayment of
interest principle is untaxed; foreign interest earned by the parent is taxed, and is not eligible for
indirect credits, but has the advantage of deductibility in host countries. In addition, astute use
of transfer pricing by a multinational allows it to shift earnings From a subsidiary to the parent or
to other subsidiaries enjoying more advantageous tax treatments. Royalty payments to the parent
can serve a similar function. Foreign governments often impose moderate taxes on dividend,
interest, rent, and royalty payments from foreign affiliates to their American parents, and these
withholding taxes are fully creditable against foreign tax liabilities of the US taxpayer.
THE HAVENS
Tax havens can offer two tax advantages to US corporate taxpayers. The first is that
earnings located in tax havens (as well as in other foreign countries) raise measured foreign
earnings for the purpose of calculating the foreign tax credit limitation. The second is that firms
with haven profits can ear', interesi on their residual US lax liability for as long as they defer
11Note that Subpart F treatment differs From actual repatriation in that the former does not
result in taxation of the passively-invested principal, if that principal was itself earned by an
active investment.B
repatriations of those profits. Both possibilities can be attractive, although they are exclusive in
that the first is triggered by repatriation, the second by deferral.
The first advantage of tax havens is to exploit a US parent's excess foreign tax credits.
The parent reduces its overall tax liability if it can attribute to a haven affiliate profitsactually
earned in a high-tax country; total taxes thereby decline by an amount equal to the difference
between the two tax rates. In order to illustrate this effect, consider a case in which the haven
profits are repatriated immediately to the US and the parent Firm's excess foreign tax credits are
used to offset any US tax liability associated with the repatriation.
Let 9 represent the present value of a foreign tax credit carried foiward into the next
year,'2 and q the profit earned in the tax haven. Letting r denote the US tax rate, the lost after-
tax US earnings of the one dollar investment is then (1 - r). The haven affiliate earns before-tax
profits of q and pays r'q to the tax haven government (where / < r). In the absence of an
excess foreign tax credit, the US tax obligation on the repatriated profits would then be (r - rq:
instead, the parent Firm uses its excess foreign tax credits to offset that obligation, in theprocess
losing the value of excess credit carryforwards equal to 9(r - r*)q. The Firm is just indifferent to
this action if:
(1 -r) =q (1 -r)- q (o(r.r*)] (1)
foregone after-tax foregone
after-tax tax haven foreign tax credit
domestic income income carryforwards
If the left side of (1) exceeds the right, then the firm has no incentive toengage in this
activity; if the right side exceeds the left then on net the action is profitable, 119 = 0 then there
is no cost to using foreign lax credits and the critical value of q is [(l-r)/(1-ri]: firms locate
investments on the basis of local after-tax profils. Alternatively, ii 0 = 1 then the critical value of
q is unity: there is no tax advantage to haven profits. One expects that the typical value of 9 lies
12Excess foreign tax credits can be carded forward only fiveyears. and at zero Intorost.9
somewhere between zero and one, but it obviously depends on many factors, including (possibly)
the level of foreign investment induced by the firm's excess credit position.
The second advantage of tax havens is to facilitate the deferral of US tax liability. Suppose
that a haven subsidiary with profits to reinvest cannot find any active investments to make in the
haven, but has the option of investing its profits in the world capital market, earning a rate or return
r (possibly different from r, the US domestic interest rate). To rule out the boundary case in
which firms want to send all their profits abroad, assume that r* ￿ r.
If r = r, the firm's optimal strategy is to defer repatriation of the untaxed portion of its
foreign profits.Passive returns earned abroad and included as Subpart F income are not
subsequently taxed again when ultimately repatriated to the United States, and so the firm is not
penalized if it repatriates interest as earned.
Suppose that the foreign subsidiary has after-foreign-tax earnings equal to M. The after-
US-tax present value of those earnings if immediately repatriated is M (1 - r)/(1 - r). If, instead,
the subsidiary repatriates interest as earned but not the principal, the parent receives an after-alt-
tax annual payment of M r(1 - r). The present value of this infinite stream, discounted at the
domestic alter-tax discount rate of r (1 - ,-), is:
IAr* (1.r)
M (2)
[1 + r (1 . r) ]J r
If r* = r, then this present value equals IA. Thus the subsidiary should never repatriate the
principle (M) it earns abroad, and the present value of those earnings is unaffected by the US tax
rate.
It is perhaps more likely that r > r*, reflecting the greater variety of uses that US parents
have for funds than do their foreign subsidiaries.'3 At what value of r* is the incentive to defer
'3Domestic firms may for example, be constrained in their use of credit markets, and so
encounter times at which the marginal productivity of an internal investment exceeds the
market rate of return. For a survey of recent suggestive evidence, see Fazzari et al (1988).10
repatriation Justoffset bythe greater (before-tax)returnavaflable In the US? SettIng (1 -
r) equaltor*/ r, the critical condition is equality of after-tax returns In the two countries:
r*(1 -r)r(1-r) (3)
If the left side of this equationexceedsthe right, finnsshould deferrepatriationof principal
indefinitely. Otherwise,repatriation should be immediate, if the firm defers repatriation, then a
higher r corresponds to a higher after-tax value of profits earned in a tax haven Jurisdiction.
Foreign subsidiaries can dispose of their after-foreign-tax profits in threeways: repatriate
profits immediately, invest them in passive assets, or (possibly) reinvest them abroad in active
investments. The knife-edged decision rule Just derived looksvery similar to the standard Hartman
(1985) condition for a foreign subsidiary's active investments. Hartman demonstrates thatforeign
subsIdiaries choosing between paying dMdends and actively investing ina low-tax country should
invest up to the point that 1(1 - r) = r(1 - r), in which I' Is themarginal product of the
subsidiary's investment. The result In (3) Is analogous.
Both the Hartrnan result and condition (3) describe the choicefacing a firm with an
alternative of immediate repatriation, There is an additionai dichotomous choice:whether to make
an active or a passive reinvestment. Analyzing this choice is somewhatcomplicated by the
possibility that a firm making an active reinvestment might want to defer repatriating Its profits until
the infinite future, or the possibility that the marginalprofitability of reinvested profits might change
In the future. Assuming that neither of these conditions hold, the firm'sproblem can be analyzed
by comparing a passive investment today with the alternative of an active investmentfor one
period followed by passive investment of the returns along with theprinciple. Comparing the
two, the critical condition is:
Mr* =M (1 +f'(l-riJ r
(4) (1 + r(I -r) J r
or:
r(1 -r) =f'(i _r*) (5)11
which is rather lamiliar from the Hariman finding: firms making active reinvestments raise their
values by the right side of (5): this comes at the cost of delaying whatever may be the alternative
uses of the stock of profits, a cost equal to the left side of (5).
Combining these results, it appears that there is the Following hierarchy: if the right side of
(5) exceeds the left, then the subsidiary should use its after-tax earnings to make active
reinvestment& If not, then the subsidiary should consult (3) and make passive investments if the
left side exceeds the right." Otherwise, the firm repatriates its earnings as dividends.15 In
generat, one expects the returns to active investments in haven locations to diminish quickly,
leaving profitable multinationals with the choice between a passive investment and immediate
repatriation. If the world capital market is efficient, then a passive investment is likely to represent
the optimal choice. And in practice. tax haven subsidiaries of US corporations do seem to place
a significant fraction of their earnings in passive investments, despite the punishing implications
of Subpart F treatment.16
DEVICES FOR MOVING TAXABLE EARNINGS TO THE HAVENS
Almost all US firms stand to benefit from earning their profits in havens rather than in the
US or a high-tax alternative. Firms with current or prospective excess foreign tax credits can use
them as described in (1): Ihose with deficit credits may be able to benelit from deferral, as
"Readers of an earlier draft inform us that Scholes and Wolison (forthcoming) also draw
these conclusions, usin a similar setup. See Horst (1977) for alternative decision rules
derived from a model with additional financing constraints.
"These calculations ignore the prior choice by the parent firm on the amount of debt
Finance to use for its subsidiary. This choice is quite likely to be affected by tax rates and
other tax-related considerations, See Hines (1939) for a more complete analysis.
161n 1982 US controlled foreign corporations in the nine major tax havens listed In Table 2
had $1.6 billion in Subpart F income, out of a totat $8.9 billion in earnings and profits. Since
Subpart F encompasses a number of activities, most but not all of this income Is likely to
represent returns to passive investments. One way to gaue its significance is that Subpart F
income for those havens was two-thirds as large as were dividends paid to US parents and
their domestic subsidiaries ($2.2 billion).12
described in (3) and (5). In both cases firms choose foreign investment projects to maximize the
alter-Foreign-tax profits. The implication is that they will locate more activity in tax havens than
business conditions would warrant in the absence of tax differences, since firms are willing to
accept lower marginal products of capital in tax havens than in high-tax countries. Another
implication is that, to the extent they are able, Firms will use financial devices to attribute to havens
their taxabte profits actually earned in high-tax locations. We identify three avenues for these
moves: the use of debt contracts, manipulations of transfer prices, and conversion of US export
income into tax haven income.
Debt Contracts
Firms have the ability to use debt contracts to adjust the locations of their tax burdens.
Since interest costs represent deductions from taxable income, and these deductions are usually
more valuable in higher tax countries, it generally makes sense to finance subsidiaries in high-
tax countries with as much debt as possible, while financing tax haven subsidiaries with as little
debt as possible. Several factors complicate this procedure, however:many countries tax cross-
border interest flows to related parties and limit the deductible level of interest payments by local
subsidiaries, while start-up subsidiaries may find it difficult to borrow heavily From unrelated banks.
Furthermore, the US government makes it costly for subsidiaries in low-tax foreign countries to
adfust their debt levels, since interest received is subject to Subpart F treatment (while interest
paid does not reduce Subpart F liabilities). In general, the tax-minimizing debt level in a subsidiary
is a complicated function of ts history and of local taxes and regulations." OFcourse, once debt
is in place, parent companies prefer that their loans to tax hayen subsidiaries carry low interest
rates, and that those to heavily taxed subsidiaries carry high interest rates. Multinationals have
a certain amount of leeway in choosing the terms of their debt contracts, subject to the same rules
that govern intrafirm transactions of goods and services.
''Hines (1989) describes optimal tinancing choices over the lifetimes of Foreign subsidiaries
in low-tax locations.13
Transfer Pricing and its Opportunities
The tax advantages of haven locations make it attractive to move taxable profits there, if
necessary by expedients such as purchasing paper clips from a haven subsidiary at $10 million
each. Such a transaction reduces taxable US income by the amount of the purchase. Since the
US tax rate is higher than haven tax rates, the tax saving produced by the $10 million deduction
in the US exceeds the tax cost of $10 million of haven profits. Of course, governments with high
tax rates are aware that firms may try to perform such sham transactions, and do their best to
prevent them.
US law contains numerous provisions concerning the location of income for tax purposes.
Section 452 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that international transfers of goods and
services between related parties (such as a parent corporation and one of its affiliates) must be
conducted at arm's length" prices -- that is, prices that unrelated firms would have used in an
identical transaction. Hence the IRS would disallow the sate of a paper clip for $10 million, since
unrelated parties would not buy one for that price. There are, however, many international
transactions for which arm's length prices do not exist. Take the case of a parent Firm that
licenses a unique patent to a foreign affiliate for production and sale: how much is the patent
worth? Since it is impossible to observe market prices for the license -- there is no market --
Congress stipulates that an equivalent price must be used: one based on the value or cost the
good or service transferred. In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, this notion of an appropriate transfer
price was refined to a price "commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible," But
this concept is difficult to apply in practice.18
Section 482 and other rules governing international transfer pricing leave ample scope for
iS mulUnationals to benefit from Iransferring valuable assets, particularly intangible assets, to tax
'8Nol to mention difficult to define in theory, See Hines (1988) For a proposed solution.
The IRS also requires firms to use 'arm's length" interest rates, but similar difficulties attend the
choice of appropriate interest rates for (possibly) risky intralirm debt contracts,14
haven subsidiaries and subsequently deferring US taxation oF the profits earned abroad thereon.'9
The recent case of Bausch & Lomb. Inc.'s Irish subsidiary is a useful illustration.'0 In 1981,
Bausch & Lomb established a subsidiary in Ireland to manufacture contact lenses using a
technique developed in New York. The lenses manufactured in Ireland were sold to the American
parent company and to affiliates in other countries. In return, the subsidiary paid the American
parent a royalty equal to 5% of net Irish sales.
The IRS challenged the legality of the 5% royalty rate, claiming that it was unreasonably low
and designed to permit the firm to shift profits to Ireland, where Bausch & Lomb operated under
a 10-year tax holiday, at the expense of the United States, a high-tax country. There is no doubt
that the Irish subsidiary was profitable: in 1982, its rate of return on investment was 106% per
annum. The court found that a 20% royalty was appropriate, on the premise that it permitted
Bausch & Lomb's Irish subsidiary an ample pre-tax annual rate of return of 27%, This is a very
generous rate of return, particularly for a firm that enjoys a tax holiday. In fact, the 27% rate was
calculated on the basis of pessimistic assumptions for the subsidiary,2' and suggests the lenient
kind of correction that a US firm might expect ii called to account for transferring intangibles to
a manufacturing subsidiary in a tax haven.
'9until 1984 US firms were permitted one overt procedure to do so: lirms could transfer
intangible property developed in the US to tax haven affiliates without triggering US tax liability,
as long as the goods produced by the intangibles were sold outside the US. The Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 rescinded this exemption.
-205ee Frisch and Horsl (1909) for a detailed summary of the court case and its
interpretation in the light of the U.S. Treasury Department's recently proposed regulations, and
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. and Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 92
IC, No.33 (March 23, 1989). Other studies of transfer pricing, including Jenkins and Wright
(19?5), Kopits (1976), and Grubert and Mutti (forthcoming), draw similar conclusions about the
ability of US Firms to transfer profits away from high-tax locations.
21Frisch and Horst (1989) argue that in fact the judge's calculations were Flawed and that
the true annual rate of return under a 20% royalty would be much higher than 27%. This
further complication illustrates some of the difficulty the government may have in enforcing
Section 482 and olher transfer-pricing rules in practice.15
Factoring Income and Other Exports
Foreign sales of goods produced in the US often create opportunities to shift taxable
income to tax havens. A common practice of US firms is to sell the receivable account to its
finance subsidiary incorporated in a tax haven. The finance subsidiary is the "factor;" the
difference between the sale price of the receivable account and the present value of the money
ultimately collected is factoring income.
Until 1984, US courts held that international factoring income of controlled foreign
corporations was not includable income under Subpart F provisions. As a result, interest earned
by finance subsidiaries was untaxed by the US until repatriated (and in the meantime only
minimally taxed by tax havens). Furthermore, it seems likely that many of these receivable
accounts were sold to finance subsidiaries in havens at generous discounts, Congress changed
the law in 1984 to include related-party factoring income under Subpart F; the profits of foreign
finance subsidiaries are therefore currently taxable (and subject to special basket limitations in
addition). As an indicator of the magnitude of tax deferral through factoring, the Joint Committee
on Taxation (1984) estimated that including factor income under Subpart F would earn the
Treasury $673 million a year by 1989.
Even after the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, there are still numerous means
by which American Firms can transfer export income earned in the United States into tax haven
income. One method is to establish a foreign trading corporation as a joint venture with a foreign
partner to escape the 50% requirement for a controlled loreign corporation. Another is to establish
a haven subsidiary that performs some real service in the production of the final product, however
trivial its actual value added. In practice, it is difficult for the US government to enforce Subpart
F and Section 482 with precision. An important question is the limit to which lirms can push the
government: as the Bausch & Lomb case illustrates, a corporation's international transactions
must to some extent be defensible before the tax authorities.16
III.Evidence on Tax Havens and Tax Rates
In this section, we test whether US firms locate income and physical operations in tax
havens and other low-tax venues to a much greater extent than normal business conditions
dictate. Recall that low tax rates attract foreign business and foreign profits in Iwo ways. The first
is that firms have incentives to transfer profits from high-tax locations where much of their
productive physical activity takes place to low-tax locations where, for lack of economic
opportunities, it does not. The second is that operations that would be unprofitable at normal tax
rates might become profitable at very low rates. We analyze these channels of tax rate influence
separately, starting wilh transfers.




in which p represents the return to local factors andthe profits earned elsewhere but attributed
for tax purposes to local operations. Note that< 0 for a country whose corporations transfer
some of their profits to other locations. The specification (6) indicates that there are positive costs
(a > 0) of transferring profits in either direction, which are assumed constant across all affiliates.




subject to . 'ii,< 0 (8)
yielding the first-order condition
fi - av'1 =,-t'i=t n (9)17
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Combining (10) and (6):
= p1[14- I - A2 j (11)
2a2a(1 -rj'
Taking logs of both sides of (11) yields:22
log-ri log (p)-4- log[1 +1- A2 ] (12)
2a 2a (1 -
One way to evaluate the second term on the right side of (12) employs a second-order
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Equation (9) implies that A2 = (1 - t)2 , so that (13) can be rewritten
t+t/2 (1+2!) a 3
logar1= log(p1) + _______ - ______ + _______ - (14)
a(1-t)2 a(1-t)2 2a(1-t)2
In order to evaluate the first term on the right side ol (14), it is necessary to specify a
production function. Suppose firms produce output 0, measured in dollars, with a Cobb-Oouglas
function 0 = cA' L° K e', in whith c is a constant term, A is the level or productivity in the local
22The log operator is sensible only if p1 > 0 and (2a + 1) (1 - r32 > A2. This second
condition is the requirement that adjustment costs, a, be large enough that aftilistes not
transfer more than all o( their profits out of the highest tax location. In practice this does not
appear to happen.18
country (represented by per capita income)! L is labor input, K Is capital input, and u isa normally
distributed stochastic term with mean zero. The local affiliate hires labor to maximize profits
0 - wL (1 -a) cA1 LOKøeu. (15)
Assuming for the moment that the affiliate is not financed by debt, then (15) represents taxable
returns (JJ) in the absence oF transfers . Combining (14) and (15) yields
4- SJogL, /toqK- fiJogA + $5r4 + fl6r12 + u,(16)
inwhich$1 = [(t+ t2/2)/a(1 -t)2 + logc+ log(1 )]' $ =o, $ = $4 =c, $= -(I
+ 2t) / [a(1 - t)2j, and fl = 3 / 2a(1 . t)'.
A second approximation to (12) yields a useful estimating equation that is similar to(16).
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion in (1 - rj around t, and using (15) yields
log,r1= $ + fl,togL4+ fl,logK4+ $jogA+ $5(l-r1) + v, (17)
inwhichfl1=[logc+log(10)) fl2=a, $ = $ =c,and $5=-f/2a.
We estimate (16) and (17) using country-level aggregate data on US nonbankmajority-
owned affiliates in 1982, treating all foreign affiliates in a country as if owned by asingle taxable
parent. The sample consists of the countries listed in Appendix Table B: the seven "Big-7' tax
havens, twenty-six Dots, seventeen industrialized countries, and Fifty-eight developing countries."
In order to separate that pan of income represenhing returns From financialresources, we subtract
Z3jn some cases, certain individual data cellswere suppressed by the Commerce
Department for confidentiality reasons, which has the effect oF shrinking some regression
samples to as few as 59 countries. Appendix A discusses at length the construction of our
sample.19
from reported income interest received and add back interest paid.Interest receipts are
themselves analyzed separately below.
Columns (1) - (4) oF Table 4 report OLS estimates of four variants or (16) and (17). Each
regression controls For capital and labor inputs, and Finds the tax variable to exert a negative effect
on reported nonFinancial profits. In addition, Column (3) reports a significant positive coefficient
on (Tax)1, as predicted in (16). Similarly, the significant negative coefficient on (1 - Tax) reported
in Column (4) is consistent with our alternative specification (17). The results of Columns (1)-(4)
are consistent with the assumed decreasing returns to scale technology, since factor coefficients
sum to about 0.8. The scaling factor for local productivity, log (GDF per capita), is unimportant
to the regression, and the results are virtually identical when log(GDF per capita) is replaced with
log (GO F)
The curvature of the tax effect is noteworthy. Based on the coefficients reported in Column
(3), raising a tax haven's tax rate from zero to 1% would lower reported nonfinancial earnings by
7%, holding the returns to real factors (capital and labor) constant. The impact of a 1% rise is
smaller at higher tax rates, levelling off to zero (taking the quadratic approximation perhaps a bit
too literally) at a tax rate of 45%. Our model predicts that at lower tax rates an increasing fraction
of an affiliate's reported earnings represents profits earned elsewhere but locally attributed for tax
purposes; so it is not surprising that lightly-taxed profits are the most sensitive to tax rates.24
There are many reasons to be wary of such literal interpretations of the tax coefficients.
These results aggregate many industries," firms, and activities together, all of them likely to be
in different economic and tax situations. Our measure of 'the' tax rate for acountry represents
24These regressions exploit the tax rate variation available in the whole sample, but donot
necessarily demonstrate that tax differences among havens affect reported earnings. In order
to confirm the existence of a tax effect among low-tax countries, all regressions reported in
Tables 4 - 6 were run using only the low-tax third of the sample (to avoid simultaneity bias, we
selected the subsample on the basis of population rather than their tax rates). The subsample
results were strikingly similar, and in no case were statistically significantly different from the
full-sample coefficients, although the tax coefficients and standard errors tended to be larger.
23Commerce Department data suppressions make it impossible to run an econometric
analysis based on data disaggregated by industry. However, it would be interesting for Future
research to obtain data from the Department on manufacturing-affiliates-only, in order to re-run
this experiment on what would probably be a more homogenous sample.20
an average annual rate for all affiliates, not a subtler index that might apply to the marginal dollar
of earnings transferred from abroad or earned by capital located within. In some countries, certain
new investments receive favorable tax treatment with accelerated depreciation allowances or tax
holidays for which older investments are no longer eligible,26 Our sample excludes countries with
so little US investment that confidentiality requirements prohibit the release of data; truncating the
dependent variable at the bottom end is likely to flatten the regression line and reduce the
estimated effect of taxes. We also do not account For the effect of non-tax attributes of tax havens
such as bank secrecy laws and law auditing and reporting requirements -- on local financial
activity, in part because our data measure only the reported operations of US firms. The real
prices of capital and labor are likely to vary widely between countries and in ways that we cannot
measure; the available data capture simply US dollar values, translated at exchange rates that may
ignore currency controls. But since some of these reasons are likely to reduce the estimated
effect of taxes on profitability, it is striking that the tax effect appears as consistently large and
significant as in Table 4.
There is an additional complication in the OLS estimation that concerns the host countries'
choice of tax rates, The OLS specifications in Table 4 assume the local tax rate on US firms to
be uncorrelated with the error term. If, instead, countries set their tax rates in response to the
unobservable variables captured in the residual -- for example. ii governments in locations with
large amounts of tax-insensitive US investment choose high tax rates in order to profit From this
investment -- then the OLS coefficients will be biased and the estimated tax effect is likely to
understate the true effect. On the other hand, ii tax obligations are to a certain degree
endogenousto firms' commitment of legal and accounting resources, then measured tax rates are
likely to be lower in profitable locations and our estimated tax coefficient overstates the true value,
In order to reduce the bias possibly arising from tax rate endogeneity, we estimated
equations (16) and (17) by an instrumental variables technique, using the log of host country
26Bond (1981) and Bond and Samuelson (1986) analyze some of the effects of tax
holidays. As we report in Appendix A, our results are not significantly different when we use
statutory tax rates instead of average tax ratea21
population as an instrument for its tax rate. The rationale for using thisinstrument is that small
countries have little locally-provided capital and so face elasticcapital supplies on the world
market; the optimal tax rates for such countries are likely to be low andpositively related to their
population sizes.2' Note that this argument concerns the supply of worldcapital, not just that
from the US. If the population of a country does not itself affect therate of return, then population
can itself be used as an instrument for the local lax rate.26
Columns (5) - (8) of Table 8 contain the lv estimates. The IVspecifications of Columns (5),
(6) and (8) look quite similar to their OLS analogs. Note however thatthe IV procedure
encounters a difficulty when the (Tax)2 term is included, as in Column(7): when [log Population)'
instruments br (Tax)', it is nol powerful enough to provide reliableestimates; as a result, the
standard errors are very large and the coefficients imprecisely estimated.Hausman tests of
equality between the estimated OLS parameters in Columns (1) - (4) and thecorresponding IV
estimates in Columns (5) - (8) fail to reject the OLS specification.
THE SENS/TIVI7Y OF FINANCIAL EARNINGS
The same tax advantages that impel firms to shift nonfinancialearnings into haven affiliates
are likely to affect their reported financial earnings in a similarway. Unlortunalely, available
financial data are not as comprehensive as dataconcerning other operations; based on the
information we were able to assemble, US multinationals doappear to shift financial earnings into
affiliates in havens and other low-tax countries.
27See Huizinga (1987) who hypothesizes that smallcountries face a highly elastic supply of
foreign capital and so maximize corporate tax revenue by levying at lowcorporate tax rates.
He confirms empirically that corporate tax rates are indeedpositively associated with (population) size.
'81n a number of auxiliary regressions (notreported), we examined the power of the
population instrument in explaining tax rates and its exogeneity to the investmentfunction. In
simple regressions, lo9 population significantly outperformed log GOP,log GDP per capita, and other aggregates in explaining tax rates. The coefficientson log poputation when Included as right-side regressors in all of the OLS regressions reported in Tables 4-6were insi9nilicant,
including respecifications of the OLS regressions in Tables 4-6 with log GOP brokeninto log population and log GDP per capita.22
Under ordinary circumstances, investors in woild capital markets should expect to receive
similar if not identical belore-tax rates of return on their financial investments. Since multinationals
have a certain amount of discretion in choosing the terms of intralirm debt contracts, but can do
so only at the cost of possible legal and regulatory action, expected financial returns in country
i (R1) will be
A1= E [r + S - ) , (18)
Fri which E1 represents net financial capital invested in country i, r is the world market interest rate,
S is the amount by which the world rate is raised or lowered by the firm For tax reporting
purposes in country i, and q influences the transaction cost of this adjustment. The firm chooses
Ss to maximize after-tax returns:29
maxV = EE1(r+S1- j (l-r) (19) L1
2r
L=1E 8L 0 . (20)
The maximization yields the first-order condition
-
](1—rj coEL foralli (21)
in which w is the multiplier associated with (20). Combining(18) and (21):
R1 = Er(i .2_-
2
(22)
2rj 2n(1 - r)2
291f the firm does not have excessforeign tax credits then there is no particular advantage
attached to interest receipts in tax havens, since they are treated immediatelyas Subpart F
Income and taxed at the US rate, The maximand (19) is therefore only an approximation of the
behavior of parents with and without excess credits.23
which is anaio9ous to (11) In the case of non-financial eamin9s; the difference between (22) and
(11) being that E1 is more readily observable than is p1.




in which l is reported interest receipts minus int&est payments, fi1 = r(l + 217) / 2q, and fl2
= - rd / 2rj. The variable E1 is reported equity in affiliates of US parent firm located In country
I, minus the property plant and equipment of those affiliates; E1 therefore represents net
investment not tied up In physical assets.
Columns (1) and (3) of TableS report OLS and IV estimates of (23). As predicted, both
regressions find p1 to be positive and significant and ft2 negative and significant: firms earn
positive interest on their financial earnings, and the (reported) interest rate is higher In counties
with lowertax rates. Since , > 0 ImplIes that ft1 > r, the OLS estimate of ft1 = 0.10 seems rather
low given the high interest rates in the early 198os, and the IV estimate of ft1 = 0.14 Is more
reassuring. A 1-lausman test rejects the OLS specification In Column (1) in favor of the IV
estimates in Column (3).
The specification of (23) relies on the assumption that dollar-denominated market interest
rates are the same In every country. If instead we allow the interest rate In country ito Incorporate
a risk premium it might be more reasonable to specify the Interest rate as a decreasing (linear)
function of per capita GDP:
r1 = + v2 GDP1 - (24)
Then (22) becomes
R1 =E1[w1 + u2GDP1] [1 •41- W
j (25)
2r 2(1 -24
and (25) can be estimated by
= $1E1÷ fl,E1GDP1+fl3 EL +fl E1GDP1 (26)
(1 — (1 — r32
inwhichfl1 = p1(1 + 2)/2Q fl2 = v2(t + 2q)/2q, fl = -v1w2/2and fi4 =
/ 2t . The specification (26) can also be used to test the restriction that fl1fl =
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 5 present estimates of the unconstrained version oF (26).
Again, a Hausman test rejects the OLS specification in Favor of the IV equation. All the parameters
are significant and of expected sign, so that interest receipts are higher in low-tax countries (ft3
c 0), and there is a negative effect of CDI' on reported interest (ft4 > 0). Indeed, one should
expect these two effects to be complementary: the presence of country-speciFic Factors in interest
rates eases the firm's job of choosing advantageous interest rates on intrafirm debt contracts since
heterogeneity adds noise to the regulators problem.
TAX RATES AND AGGREGATE EARNINGS
From the viewpoint of tax haven governments, our results confirm the ability of US Firms
to report income in low-tax jurisdictions even when corresponding physical activity doesnot take
place there. But that is only the first pal of the story that interests governments. Theregressions
reported in Tables 4 estimate the proFitability of local affiliates holding constant local inputs such
as labor and plant and equipment. In practice firms choose their physical inputs simultaneously
with choosing Ihe level of profits they declare. Wesuspect that these choices are very
simultaneous indeed: Firms that minimize taxes by shifting profits to havensmight do well also to
establish signiFicant physical operations in the same havens. Hence there should bea significant
relationship between tax rates and levels of employed factors, a relationship we nowexplore.25
A foreign government can lure US business to its shores with a variety of attractions,
especially but not exclusively low tax rates. One of the best nontax inducements is a vibrant
economy in which lirms can make profits. Thus we assume that a foreign government chooses
its corporate income tax rate in part to stimulate greater foreign activity, conditional on the state
of its economy. One expects American firms to earn more aggregate profit in Germany than In
the Netherlands, despite the similarity of their tax rates arid their per capita GDPs, because the
German market is so much larger. The calculations presented in Appendix B derive from our
model the Following specification of the aggregate earnings equation, using a second-orderTaylor
approximation:
log i- =-- fl 1 + $3 r12 + log GDP4- e . (27)
The model predicts that $ > 0, fl2 c 0, 03 > 0, and $ > 0.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating (27); the OLS estimates in column 2 are
consistent with the predicted signs of our coefficients. The estimated ,9 and $2 again suggest that
there is significant curvature in the effect of tax rates on reported earnings: they imply that raising
the tax rate from zero to 1% lowers earnings by 20%, and that the marginal effect of taxes dies
down to zero as the tax rate reaches 43%. An estimate of the linear version of (27) appears in
Column (1); its negative coefficient on the tax rate variable is consistent with the result in Column
(2).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 report IV estimates corresponding to the OLS specifications.
As before, the linear version performs quite well with instrumental variables, and a Hausman test
rejects the OLS specification of the linear equation (Column (1)) in favor of the IV specification
(Column (3)). Unfortunately, the standard errors on tax and tax squared become quite large in
Column (4), reflecting the difficulty of identifying the two tax terms separately using our
instruments,26
The model presented in Equation (7) implies that the Factor demand equations take
particular lorrns; Appendix B derives second-order approximations to those equations. The
approximations imply that log KL and log L1 should be negative functions of tax rates and positive
lunctions of tax squared; further, log GDPL should enter with a positive coefficient. Table 7
presents estimates of these equations.
As predicted, Columns (2) and (6) of TableT report significant negative coefficients on tax
variables in the labor and capital regressions, along with coefficients on tax squared that are
positive but not significant. As before, the IV regressions perform much better in the linear variants
of the estimating equations than in the versions that include tax squared; a Hausman test rejects
the OLS specification in Column (1) against the IV specification in Column (3), and nearly rejects
the OLS specification in Column (5) against the IV equation in Column (7). Log GDP1 is always
significant and its coefficient is estimated to be very close to unity. Hence it appears that tax
policy affects the location of productive factors,3° but not with the same kind of powerful
nonlinearity observed for reported earnings.
COMPANIES WITH TAY HAVEN OPERATIONS
For two reasons it is valuable to supplement our regression results with a closer
examination of the behavior of haven affiliates: one, because data limitations have prevented us
from including banking affiliates in our regression sample, and two, in order to explore whether
firms in fact use the income-shifting channels available to them. Fully 40% of US companIes with
foreign affiliates had at least one affiliate in a tax haven venue (Table 8). And although tax haven
use is substantial iii every industrial grouping, there is significant variation among industries. For
instance, almost all US banking and international shipping corporations locate at least one affiliate
30Columns (9)-(12) report estimates of the labor demand equation with total employment as
the dependent variable; the equations fit very poorly, particularly when compared to the
equations (reported in Columns (-(4)) that use employee compensation as the dependent
variable. This is consistent with -- though of course not a confirmation of -- our prior that
compensation better reflects labor input.27
in a tax haven country, as do a majority of petroleum companies, while only about a third of firms
in other industries had one or more tax haven affiliates. An alternative perspective Issimilarly
impressive: out of 18,339 US Foreign affiliates located throughout the world, almost one in six is
located in a tax haven. Again, there is substantial variation across industries. Nearly all
international shipping affiliates and almost 40% of banking affiliates are in tax havens, while firms
in other industries cluster quite close to the "all industries' percentage3'
It comes as no surprise that assets and equity in tax havens are relatively heavily weighted
toward the financial sector (Table 9). While the financ'iaJ sector constitutes 40 - 50% of US FDI
assets, it accounts for 64% of the assets of tax haven affiliates. Though gross assets may
exaggerate financial sector investments, especially in banking, the equity position of tax haven
affiliates32 is similarly skewed toward finance (63%, versus 14% in other industrial countries and
5% in other developing countries). in contrast, the sectoral distribution of employment in tax
haven affiliates is quite similar to that in other US foreign affiliates. The non-financial sectors are
overwhelmingly important as employers, although the small share of financial sector employment
is still much larger than its counterparts in non-haven countries,
While banking and finance account for a majority of the corporate assets and equity in tax
havens, the primary users of havens are non-financial parent corporations. As Table 10 shows,
many financial affiliates belong to non-financial parent companies.33 In fact, only a minority
(28.7%) of the affiliates of non-financial parents is in the same industry as its parent. While few
non-banks own banking affiliates, many possess affiliates for shipping and wholesaling their
products and for handling the finances of the parent and its related network of affiliates. And of
"In terms of the havens' share of worldwide US foreign direct investment, investment is
a9ain skewed across industries: Table 13 indicates that while more than 90% of US foreign
direct investment in shipping is located in tax havens, along with more than one third of
banking and non-bank financial investment, only 6.2% of US foreign industrial investment Is In
havens.
32The Commerce Department does not collect data on bank equity.
"One might prefer to use assets, rather than the number of affiliates, to measure the
pattern of tax haven affiliates owned by non-financial parent companies. This measure
produces similar results, presented in Appendix Table B, except that it is more heavily
weighted toward financial affiliates.28
course, the potential for tax reduction offers one of the best reasons to locate such operations
in a tax haven.
IV. The Interests of Tax Havens
Tax havens are likely to be particularly sensitive to the revenue implications of their capital
taxation policy. If the tax rate on foreign multinationals can be set independently of other lax
rates, revenue maximization would imply unitary elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax
rate.If the elasticity exceeds one, then lowering the tax rate would increase revenue, Small
countries, particularly the Dots, may have elastic corporate tax bases at most positive vatues.3
since taxable income in a haven depends on both the volume of profitable physical activity and
the level of profits earned elsewhere but claimed locally.
The regressions described in Table 6 of Section 2 suggest that revenue maximizing tax
rates are very low, roughly on the order of actual rates in havens. Denote taxable income in
country i by Y (ri); tax revenue equals TL 't'L, which is maximized with respect tor1 when
tr1 dY1/dr10. (28)
In the quadratic specification (Column 2). dYj/drL equalsfl V1 + $2 r V1. From (28), this
implies
IYTL•282 r2 + I= 0. (29)
and solving for r:
= - (8 - 8fi2)"2
(30)
3Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) infer from this observationthat the burdens of their capital
taxes are likely to tall on local immobile actors and on world capital.29
which, evaluated at the parameter estimates in Column (2) olTable 6, yields a
revenue-maximizing
tax rate of &72%,' Country-specific conditions no doubt affect local tax base elasticities, butthe
fact that many havens have tax rates close to this benchmark 6% suggests that theirbehavior is
consistent with tax revenue maximization without local rate adjustments,
Considerations other than corporate income tax revenue are likely to influencea
government's choice of tax rate. Even in zero-tax locations, governments often collect Iees from
local corporations. Moreover, taxation of the labor income of local and expatriateworkers, and
of their consumption and imports, offers a potentially much larger source of revenue, Inaddition.
local workers earn rents if employed by foreigners at wages that exceed reservationlevels.
Furthermore, foreign firms and workers may purchase local goods and services,thereby
stimulating local economies, and may have beneficial spillovers through the diffusion of new
technologies or production techniques. On the other side of the ledger, foreign business activity
may also be associated with negative externalities, such as pollution, dissipative rent-seeking by
local workers, and (from the point of view of local officials) undue politicalpower concentrated
among foreign firms.
Despite the attractiveness of US business for foreign governments and the magnitude of
US firms' foreign operations, US multinationals play only a small part in theeconomy of a typical
host country Table 11 presents median values of the fraction of countries' populationsemployed
by US Firms, along with other indicators oF their significance. US firms in 1982 employed 0.4% of
the population in the median industrialized country, and 0.04% in the median developing country.36
35The second-order condition guarantees that this, the larger of the two roots ci(29).
represents the revenue-maximizing tax rate. Forumlly, the second-order condition is that the
deriv9tive c31 the left side of (28) with respect to r is npgative; this derivative is 2 (dYjdr ) +
r (d Yjd r1j. In the quadratic specification (d2t( Id i-1) =+ 2fl2) (dVL/drj + 212 Y1. Since the first-order condition guarantees that dYjdrL = 0, and 'L and,- are assumed to be
positive, the second-order condition imposes that fl C 0. From inspection oF (30) it us clear
that the smaller root of (29) is negative, a possibility we rule out by assumption.
36These are country medians, so that, for example, the value 0.862%represents the
employment/ population ratio for the country with the fourth hiQhest ratio among the Big-7
group. Of course, these median calculations obscure large variations in employment eftects
across countries.30
This contrasts with a much higher 0.9% for the median Big-7 country, but only 005% for the
median Do! (the latter being of comparable magnitude to thai for other developing countries).
US firms do pay their employees relatively well, however, and in that way may exert more
(though still limited) influence over local economies. Median US employee compensation
represented about 1% of GOP in industrialized countries and again only 0.4% in developing
countries, while in havens compensation amounted to 2.5% of GOP in the Big-7 countries and 1%
in the Dots. Median US value added was 2.5% of GDP in developed countries, 1.5% of GOP in
developing countries, but 4% in the Dots and almost 5% among the Big-7. Tax haven
governments take only a small part of this value-added: median taxes paid by US firms was 1.2%
of GOP in developed countries and 0.7% in developing countries -- the equivalent in both groups
to about half of US affiliates' value added. Haven governments collected similar shares of their
GOP from taxation of local US affiliates --1.1% among the Big-7 and 0.6% In the Dots--but these
revenues constituted a burden of only 22% and 14% of the affiliates' value added, respectively.
In order to judge how tax havens have fared in their arrangements with US firms, one must
speculate about how they would have done if they had not elected to be havens. For the major
Dots, the correct yardstick is probably the performance of non-haven developing countries. By
this standard, they have done well in terms of employment and value added, and comparably in
terms of tax revenue. However, it seems that the Big-7 tax havens may enjoy the largest rewards:
US firms employ more of their labor force and produce more of their economies' value added than
they do in each of the other country groupings; and this comes at littte apparent net cost in overall
tax revenue.31
V.Implications for the United States
AGGREGATE TAXREVENUES
A capital-exportingcountrylike the US prefers thatits ownfirms locate domestically, since
their profits are then subject to home taxation and their operations may generate other positive
externalities, If firms do earn their profits abroad, then the US government benefits most from
profits earned In tax havens, since fewer foreign tax credits are available on haven profits than on
profits earned In high-tax foreign countries.
Aggregate revenue figures confirm the importance of tax haven profits as sources of US
tax revenue, Table 12 presents tabulations of total taxable foreign income In 1982 from all sources
(including repatriated dividends, branch profits, interest income, Subpart F Income, and others).
Applying a 46% US corporate income tax rate to this income, the US government received total
net-of-tax-credit revenues of $7.94 billion, of which $2.99 billion, or 38%, was located In the sbcteen
most Important tax havens.
This simple exercise of course Ignores the common practice of applying excess foi'elgn tax
credits against haven earnings. Reporting limitations make It Impossible to know by exactly how
much that device reduces US tax revenue from repatriated tax haven earnings; three reasons
suggest that its impact is small, however. The first is that there is nothing special about tax haven
profits Ironi the standpoint of firms with excess foreign tax credits making repatriation decisions;
what matters is the residual tax liability of the repatriated profits. Hence even If excess tax credits
carried forward from previous years significantly reduced US tax liabilities In 1982, tax havens
should still be expected to account for 38% of the remaining revenue. The second reason Is the
opportunity cost of using excess foreign tax credits: credits used this year cannot be carried
forward into next year. Tax havens that absorb excess credits this year lndirecUy contribute to tax
revenues next year. The third reasonIsthat, in practice, tax haven Income does not appear to
be washed out by excess foreign tax credits. Goodspeed and Frlsch (1989) report that In 198432
50% of US Foreign-source income was associated with parent corporations with excess foreign tax
credits; in their country breakdown only 32% of foreign-source income from identifiable tax havens
(Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore. Hong Kong, Caribbean, and Central America) was received by
US parents with excess foreign tax credits.
REVENUE EFFECT OF FOREIGN TAX ChANGES
The longstanding negotiating position of the US government is that it supports bilateral
agreements that reduce source-basis taxation of profits earned by multinationals. As a traditional
capital exporter, the US has been understandably eager to substitute residence For source-basis
taxation.3' The preceding argument suggests, however, that the US government may not always
benefit From reductions in foreign tax rates. Lower foreign tax rates may attract business abroad
that otherwise would be located in America. Furthermore, changes in one foreign country's tax
rate may affect firms' taxable incomes in other countries, thereby changing the revenue ultimately
collected by the US government when the income is repatriated.
In order to analyze the issues involved, consider the case of a US Firm with deficit foreign
lax credits that organizes its foreign operations as wholly-owned subsidiaries. Suppose that this
firm's motivation to locate operations and profits in tax havens is their favorable tax rates, and that
it would get little return from reinvesting any of its haven earnings in plant and equipment. Plant
and equipment located there serves partly as &cover for transfer pricing, factoring, and other
activities designed to move profits to haven locations. If the haven subsidiaries have access to
world capital markets that offer the same pre-tax returns as those available in the US. then from
(3) and (5), 'it is clear that subsidiaries will passively reinvest all of their profits, and the present
value to the parent firm of these reinvested profits just equals M, the alter-foreign-tax earnings of
subsidiaries.
"It remains to be seen whether this attitude persists in the changing international regime In
which the United States is now the world's largest capital importer.33
What tax revenue would the US government earn from these profits? Since theoptimal
strategy of lirms is to repatriate their (after-loreign-tax) passive income as earned, and firms are
eligible for tax credits for Foreign tax obligations associated with this passive income, the US
government receives a fraction (i-5 - r) of the (before-foreign-tax) passive foreign income. The
annual flow of US tax revenue is (rus - r) r M , so if the government discounts at r, thepresent
value of US tax revenue is (5 - ri M, Since M represents after-tax foreign profits from active
operations, the present value of US tax revenue equals:
= (r - r) yr (1 - r) (31)
All other things equal, the US government receives far more tax revenue from the before-
tax profits that US firms earn in low-tax countries than from the profits they earn in high-tax
countries. There are two avenues for this effect: the present value of repatriated foreign earnings
equals ,r(1r*), a negative function of the foreign tax rate; while the foreign tax credit earned by
those repatriations is a positive Function of the foreign tax rate.
The second of these effects separates the interests of US firms from those of the US
government. Firms Following the passive-repatriation strategy maximize their after-foreign-tax
profits, r (1 - rt). From their point of view, the foreign tax rate per se is immaterial; what matters
is after-tax profitability. From the US government paint of view r is very important, since it greatly
influences the present discounted value of its tax revenues.
Total US taxes paid by Ameriban multinationals depend in pad on the taxation of US
earnings. Domestic income of t, earns the US Treasury ruslrus in tax revenue immediately. If
US corporations then invest their altertax profits of (I . r) at the interest rate r and pay tax
on the interest as earned, then the present value of tax receipts from reinvested earnings is r5
C - r) ir. Hence the presenl value of total tax revenues generated by domestic profits of ,r
equals Tus (2 - rug)34
Consider American multinationals with subsidiaries in n foreign countries, earning active
foreign profits of r in each country I and earning r In the US. The present value of US tax
revenues produced by these profits, inclusive of taxes on future interest earnings, equals:
PV, (r- ,-j r1 (1 -+ rj (2_rut) r (32)
The impact of a small change in the tax rate of country J Is:
d(PVUS)= S (TUS-r1)(1-i1) - iij (1 +r5-2r3) + r5(2-r5)th'. (33)
dr3 dr th3
In order to evaluate (33) It Is necessary to measure the eFfect of a change In J's tax rate on
profits in each country i. Under the best of circumstances this would be a daunting task; the
cross-sectional nature of the available data makes a complete evaluation Impossible, especially
insofar as in predicting the effect of a small change inon the taxable domestic profits of US
Firms. Let 6 represent th05 / dr Suppose that a small change In r1 affects the location of
worldwide profits but not the aggregate vo1ume of profits. Then 6 + 51dr1/dr3 = 0. II dr1/dr
were known, and as a first approximation Ihe tax change shifts Income Into other locations In
proportion to their local profits, then dr/dr = r. with a = [- dr1/dr3 - 5] /r J.
Consider the impact of a tax change in a small tax haven with an initial tax rate of zero
and a very small fraction of US overseas business. The value of the summationrj
(1 - rj x in (33) is $3.6 billion, while total Foreign earnings were $30.9 billion; the estimate in
column 2 of Table 6 implies that dr3/dr equals - 0.20 r. The change in US tax revenue Is,
thereFore,
d(PV,)= (0.12) 1dr3 - 631 + rus dr3 - (I + + 6 (2- r) rU (34)
dr dr3 dr335
Applying the 1982 lax rate= 0.46 and the estimated dr / dr = (-0.2) then (34) becomes
d(PV) / dr = (0.59) E - (1.58) lrj.
For any reasonable parameter values, this expression is negativeindicating that US tax
receipts would be reduced by higher tax rates in the havens. Note in particular thateven If=
- dr / dr. so that all of the profits that shifted out of the haven were shifted into the
US, dPVUS
/ dr = -1.4 1r. Hence a 1% increase in the haven tax rate reduces US tax revenuesby 1.4% of
haven income; since US revenues were 46% of haven income, thisrepresents a 3% reduction in
revenues. This result arises because income is not sufficiently mobile to Fully offset thegreater
foreign tax credits generated by the new, higher tax rate in country j. And in the realisticcase In
which some haven income flows into high-tax foreign countries, the outcome iseven worse for
the US Treasury.
These results illustrate the cost to the US of high foreign tax rates, though ofcourse there
is a limit to how far one can take this kind of exercise. The estimated behavioralresponses from
cross-section data are valid only for small changes within a rather static environment; inparticular,
it would not be consistent to draw inferences from the data about the likelyresponse of all
countries to a US tax change that, for example, raised bilateral withholding tax rates with all ofour
treaty partners. Furthermore, in response to large changes, firms are likely to find alternative tax-
avoiding practices within the United States.38
38lnctuding expanded use of Puerto Rico, other US possessions, and 'on-shore' locations
and activities that receive favorable tax treatment, Many of the same issues discussed in this
paper also apply to the Puerto Rico case, though a number of the specifics differ. See US
Treasury (1989) for an analysis of US business operations in Puerto Rico and other
possessions covered by Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code.36
VI. Conclusion
The evidence presented here offers a consistent view of the patlern or tax haven use by US
multinational corporations. As measured by reported income, American companies locate a
sizeable Fraction of their loreign activity in tax havens. It appears, however, that this fraction
includes reported profits that would not normally be earned by the quantities of factors employed
by US firms in the havens. This relationship between low tax rates and abnormally high profit rates
consists of the reported financial earnings of tax haven affiliates as well as their nonfinancial
earnings.
The ability to shift reported earnings into haven affiliates raises the already significant
atlractiveness of haven locations for ordinary business operations; as a result. tax rates are
inversely r&ateci to local employment of capital and labor. The endogenous location of Factors
when combined with the ability to shift reported profits away from high-tax locations makes total
taxable earnings in a country quite sensitive to tax rates. This elasticity may partly explain the
behavior of tax haven governments: for a small country with a small indigenous tax base, a
corporate tax rate on the order of 6% represents a revenue-maximizing choice.
It is undoubtedly true thai some American business operations are drawn away From the
mainland US by the lure of low tax rates in tax havens; nevertheless, on net the policies of tax
havens appear to enhance the US Treasurys ability to collect tax revenue from American
corporations. In the available data from 1982. 38% of the tax revenue due the US government
trorn foreign operations of US corporations is attributable to tax haven affiliates. Furthermore, our
regressions imply that higher tax rates on the part of havens would cost the US government tax
revenue by generating additional foreign tax credits.
The future of American relations with the tax havens may, however, be changing, as foreign
direct investment into the United States increases in volume and seeks tax-minimizing channels
through the same tax havens that American firms have used For years. One indication of this
change may be the recent attention directed at perceived abusive tax practices by US affiliates37
of foreign parents. Current relations between the United States and the tax havensoffer a deficate
balance or advantages and disadvantages, one that may well evolve with futureeconomic
conditions and legislative reforms.REFERENCES
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Almost any country can serve as a tax haven to certain classes of investments under certain
circumstances. An often cited example of this truism is the ciassification of the US as a tax haven
for foreign flight capital since the US eliminated its withholding tax on dividends and interest paid
to foreigners. For this reason, any tax haven listing must necessarily be somewhat arbitrary.
In general, tax havens are locations with low Lax rates, and as such they are attractive to
business. However! since rational Firms maximize after-tax profits -- which is not Lhe same thing
as minimizing taxes (thelatter for example satisfied by making losses) -- low tax rates alone do
not successful havens make. The business literature usually describes tax havens in terms of four
attributes that, taken together, make a location particularly desirable: (i) low corporate or personal
tax rates;(ii)legislation that supports banking and business secrecy; (iii) advanced
communications facilities; and (iv) sell-promotion as an offshore financial center.
Thisvague characterization makes the process of classifying tax haven countries somewhat
arbitrary at the margin. We take as a point of departure the internal Revenue Manual's list ci 32
countries that it identifies as tax havens for purposes of US businesses.39 We then use data from
States (1985-7) to delete From our tax haven list countries in which foreign corporate taxes paid
by US companies is greater than 20% of pre-tax income (actually, the average tax rate is on the
order of 50% in each country eliminated).° These countries were presumably identiFied as havens
not because of low tax rates, but for other characteristics, such as bank or commercial secrecy,
an absence of exchange controls, or low personal income tax rates. We eliminate three countries
on this basis: Austria, Costa Rica and the Netherlands,
Beauchamp's (1983) listing of tax havens (without specific reference to the US) includes all
ol the IRS-designated countries, plus 5 others. We also include these countries, but restrict them
"Glautier and Bassinger (1987) suggests that this list should be treated as the guideline to
tax havens identified as such by the United States, although the IRS notes that the list should
not be considered exhaustive.
°For countries whose average tax rate could not be obtained, we instead used corporate
statutory tax rates of less than Ia percent, as revealed in either Price-Waterhouse (1983) or
Doggart (1983).to countries in which the average tax rate was less than 10% for US companies. This list consists
of Anguilla, Andorra, Jordan, Lebanon, Macao, Monaco, St. Martin. In addition, thissame criterion
was applied to havens discussed in the Economist Intelligence Unit's tax haven volume (Doggart,
1983), resulting in the inclusion of Dorninica, Maidives, Malta, Marshall islands, and St. Lucia.By
this method we identify 41 countries and regions as tax havens for the purposes of US businesses
(see Appendbc Table A).
Note that there are seven countries not classified as havens -- Argentina, Bangladesh,
Ecuador, French islands (Pacific), South Korea, Taiwan and Uruguay — whose corporate tax rates
are comparable to those of the relatively high-tax havens. Recall that tax rates do not constitute
the only criterion of tax haven status. In particular, none of these seven countries isgenerally
recognized as a tax haven, nor do they so promote themselves. Further, nearly all of their US-
source direct investment is in manufacturing, with essentially no finance, wholesale trade or
international shipping sector& Finally, most of them have lacked other essential preconditions for
being a tax haven, such as freedom from capital controls and other regulations, an unfettered
domestic financial market, or an advanced system of international communications.
Our analysis relies on the latest available data concerning foreign direct Investment,
gathered in the US Department of Commerce' 1982 comprehensive Benchmark Survey? The
Benchmark Survey is conducted on an irregular basis every several years, using a balance of
payments framework as its foundation. Firm participation in the survey Is obligatory and includes
all firms with affiliates whose assets exceed $3 million. The US Department of Commerce (1985)
publishes only a small part of the data which are essential for our analysis in Its US Direct
Investment Abroad. However, the Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis provided us with
aggregate figures calculated from proprietary benchmark survey data. (Variable means and
standard deviations are included as Appendix Table B)
For conFidentiality reasons, substantial elements of the Benchmark Survey data are
unavailable to the public. These suppressed data were Included in the preparation of all of the
paper's non-econometric analysis, since this was presented In aggregated form. However, the
restriction on the use of suppressed data does limit our econometric analysis in some respects.II does not constrain the samples of either "Big-7' tax havens or industrialized countries. Yet it
reduces the number or observations on "dots" to 17 from 34, and the observations on developing
countries to 41 from 5O." Moreover, even among the observations for which most data were
available, suppressions of certain individual data cells had the effect of shrinking the regression
samples in some cases to as few as 58 countries.
The econometric analysis also required data on population and gross domestic product,
neither of which are contained in the benchmark survey data, For the most part, these could be
obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and Government Finance Statistics.
However, these sources do not include several of the smallest countries; additional data were
obtained from either UNESCO's Statistical Yearbook or The Statesman's Year-book.
The tax rates calculated for regressions are presented in Appendix Table C. Of course, no
single measure of the corporate income tax rate can accurately capture the precise differences
in tax burdens corporations face in different countries. For one thing, the complexity of tax codes
(including different provisions for tax deductions, depreciation rules, loss carryforwards and
carrybacks. and nonstandard income concepts) precludes the possibility of distilling a well-defined
ax rate for each country. In addition, a single tax rate cannot capture industry- and firm-specific
tax holidays or other features.'2
We used two complementary sources to obtain these data, the benchmark survey itself and
Price.Waterhouse' (1983) Corporate Taxes: A Worldwide Summary. The benchmark survey data
provide a first approximation: corporate income taxes paid by all US affiliates in a country, divided
by their total pre-tax income, In principle, this has the advantage of reflecting the amount of taxes
that corporate affiliates actually pay. However, since many companies in some countries have
negative earnings, this measure tends to overstate the tax rate in those countries. In practice, this
'1We also exclude from the sample three categories of countries on the grounds that the
nature of foreign investment in these groups is likely to be guided by unique or idiosyncratic
considerations, These are oil exporters. Sub-Saharan Africa (except Southern Africa), and
Socialist countries.
'2Moreover, since some of each corporation's tax payments typically are returned in the
form of government-provided services and subsidies, a complete measure of the tax burden
would have to account for the burden of taxes net of subventions. Unfortunately, they are
impossible to measure in practice,calculation actually results in average tax rates for some countries substantiallyexceeding top
statutory marginal rates (including subnational taxes).
Since we expect this lop tax rate to be an upper bound oncorporations' actual Lax
burdens! we define the average tax rate as the lesser of the benchmarksurvey tax rate and the
statutory rate. In addition, tax rate data are unavailable from these two sources for some of the
smallest tax haven countries. For these countries, we obtain the tax rate from the Economist's
TaxHavensand their Uses (Doggart, 1983).
As a check of robustness we also ran each regression using only statutory tax rates(from
Price Waterhouse (1983) and Doggart (1983)) as an alternative tax measure. Inno case did the
alternative lax coefficients differ significantly from the coefficients on our preferred taxvariable.
This result is consistent with the findings of Grubert and Multi (forthcoming)using a different
specification run on a small extract of the same data set.
Like the tax variable, the other measured variables represent aggregates for all US affiliates
located within each sample country.'3 'Plant, property, and equipment' serves asour measure
of physical capital employed by affiliates. The shortcoming of this variable, particularly fora study
of tax havens! is the fact that the Commerce Department does not collect this inFormation for the
banking industry. Unfortunately, neither does any banking regulatory agency, and no alternative
exits. While this problem is potentially important, it should also be noted that less than onequarter
of tax haven income derives from banking, and that the capital-output ratio is in any case relatively
low in the banking industry. Thus the Commerce Department variable 'plant,property, and
equipment' is probably reasonably accurate, even in tax havens that are known for financial
activities.
'Plant, property, and equipment' is measured in dollar units. Similarly, the heterogeneity
of labor inputs argues br measuring them by their dollar value. For this reason, weproxy for the
independent variable 'Labor' using "Total Employee Compensation,' in order to better measure
efFiciency equivalent units of labor inputs. One restriction implied by the use of Compensation is
"They do not include any income earned or factors employed outside the (Foreign)
country of the affiliate.that employment and wages have the same impact on profitability.Accordingly, we also
disaggregated "Employment' and Wag& (the latter defined as Total Compensation / Employment)
in each of our tests. Unlike the coefficients on "Cornpensation, these coefficients do not lend
themselves to a straightforward interpretation as the labor share. Rather they enabled us to verily
that the sign, size, and significance are similar For the alternative measure.APPENDIX B: MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION
This Appendixpresentsderivations of the reduced form earnings equations and factor
demand equations, the estimates of which are presented in Tables 6 and r
Return to the maximization problem (7) and (8), excluding as before the returnto financial
assets; for a firm allocating a fixed stock of capital and adjusting its transFer pricesas in (10), its
problem is:
maxV = E (1 -r,) p(K.l { 1 ÷ 1 - A
(81)
2a 2a(1 -
subjeci to E K, -c K (82)
yielding the first-order condition
(1-rJ[1 •i - ,2 = p. (83)
2a2a(1 r
in which p' is the marginal product of capital in country i, andp is the Lagrange multiplier
corresponding to constraint (82). From the production function (13), the marginal product of
capital is
= a ct(E tht A111t1 (84)
Combining (83) and (84). and imposing the condition that p,p.' K, / a yields




2a 2a(1-r1)2Combining (85) with (10) produces the following expression for non-financial taxable income as
a function of local GDP and local tax rates:
(11 (t—a-Ø) (1 r) (2! ( 1-2—0) [1 + - ____________ (86)
2a 2a(1-rj2
Taking logs:
log rr = [log (ci) + log A1] + alog (1 - rj
1-a- (1-aM
(67)
log [1 + _L-
A2
l-a- 2a2a(1-rj
Taking a second-order Taylor expansion around the point F at which (1 - t) = A,
log ,r1_j_, [log (c40p_a) + a log (1 - I) + a(2-t)+ (l-4)(t +12/2)
1-a— 2(1-t) a(1-t)2
log A1- ° + (1-)(1 +2)/a L + a/2 + 3(1-)/2a 72(68)
1 —a—4' (1 -a-)(1 -t)2 (1 -a'4)(1-t)2
Hence nonfinancial earnings should be a negative function of local tax rates, a positive tax
squared and a positive function of local GDP.
There remains the problem or taxable local Financial earnings. it is not always possible, or
even desirable, for Firms to separate real and financial decisions in the way we have modeled them
to do. The location of financial equity is likely to be a complicated matter, generally an inverse
function or the tax rate. As illustrated in Hines (1989), financial equity can be expected to
accumulate in locations where profits are earned by non-financial factors, particularly if those are
low-tax countries. Once financial equity is located, returns are governed by (24), also an inverse
Function of 7L As a result, we expect financial earnings to behave in the same way as non-
financial earnings do in our approximation (Ba). and so specify total revenues as a negative
function of i-1 and a positive function of r12.FACTOR DEMANDS
It is also Straightforward to derive the demands for productive factorsas Functions of tax
rates and local GDP. Starting with capital, combine (83), (84) and therelation p1 = p1 K1/ a to
obtain:




log (K1) _____ log (cp1) - log a } + ______ log A1 + log (1-r1)
1-a-
+ j.log[1 + 1 A2
(810)
2a 2a(1-rj2
Taking a second-order approximation to (810):
log K1 =1 [log (ct') - (1-c-) log a +log(1-t) + + (1-H1+t2/2)
(1 -a-s) 2(1 -t) a(1—t)'
(B 11)
+ log A, -(1-) (1 + 1/a + 2t/a)
r1 +(1-)(1 + 3/a)
1 —a4 (I -o-) (1 - t)2 2(1 -a-)(1 -t)2
The approximation (811) implies, therefore, that local property, plant and equipment(K1) should
be a negative function of local tax rates, a positive function of tax squared, anda positive (unction
of local CDI'.
The demand For labor can be derived in a similar fashion. Recall that the constant shares
property of Cobb-Douglas production functions implies that L1(1 - a) p1; applying (B5) and
taking logs yields:log L log (1-a) +
1
[log (,4øpQ) + ______ log A1 i-a- (B12)
a a I A2 + ______ log(1-rj t ______ log [I +— -
1 -a- 1 -a- 2a 2a(1-rj2
Applying the usual second-order approximation yields:
log L1 = log (1-a) + [log (0f5 + a log (1 - t) +





1 -a-i (1 -a-) (1 — r) 2(1 -a-)(1 -t)2
in which local labor compensation (L1) Is a negative function of local tax rates, a positive function



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IN THE PRIMARY TAX HAVENS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property,
Number of Net Plant &
U.S. Income' Assets Equipmentb Employment
Affiliates($millions)($millions)(Smillions) (000s)
Switzerland 524 1,829 31,003 1,260 46.2
Bermuda 352 1,965 26,953 167 3.0
HongKong 321 841 29,833 1,957 54.1
Netherlands
Antilles 315 1,370 49,140 479 3.5
Singapore 238 688 27,727 1,423 48.7
Ireland 215 758 6,025 1,197 38.9
Panama 193 678 18,124 550 25.4
Bahamas 178 1,245 91,004 402 8.5
Cayman & other
U.K. Islands 156 1,252 49,524 24 0.7
Printary lax haven" rolors to the lax havens wilh the largesl number ci 1)5 Foreign altiliates and Iho
greatest amount of 1982 net income oF US loroign affiliates. These data excludes shJpping affiliates, which
for these purposes are not attributed to individual countries.
"Whether or nor income was repatriated to parent corporation.
'Plant, properly & equipment data are collected only or non—bank firms.
source: U.S. Department of Cortynerce (1985).
TABLE 3
TAX HAVENS IN 1977 AND 1982
(as a percentage of U.S. worldwide foreign direct investment)
ASSETS EMPLOYMENT
1977 1982 1977 1982
All
Havens 11.3% 26.0% 4.0% 4.3%
Excluding
Big-7 3.8% 16.9% 0.6% 0.5%






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SECTORAL AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF






Banking $218.3 $291.4 $72.5
(60.8%) (37.1%) (35.4%)
Non-Bank $84.2 $90.1 $ 8.6
Financial (23.5%) (11.5%) (4.2%)
Non- $56.6 $403.8 $123.9
Financial (15.8%) (51.4%) (60.4%)
BY EQUITY
($billions)
Tax . Other Other
Haven Industrial Developing
Countries Countries Countries
Non-bank $30.7 $21.8 $2.2
Financial (62.5%) (13.7%) (4.7%)
Non- $18.4 $137.7 $45.0






Banking 20.3 75.0 59.7
(7.2%) (1.7%) (3.3%)
Non-bank 9.0 103.1 16.0
Financial (3.2%) (2.4%) (0.9%)
Non- 254.7 4,110.7 1,715.0
Financial (89.7%) (95.8%) (95.8%)
Note: The Coinnerco Dopannienfs Benchmark Survey does not ooilect the vatiable Equily For banks.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All Countries 56.6 18.1
16 Tax Havens 7.8 0.6
source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics ot IncomeAPPENDIX TABLE A
TAX HAVEN COUNTRIES
IRS-IDENTIFIED BEAUCHAMP DOGGART
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA ANGUILLA DOMINICA
BAHAMAS ANDORRA MALDIVES
BAHRAIN JORDAN MALTA
BARBADOS LEBANON MARSHALL ISLANDS
BELIZE MACAO ST. LUCIA
BERMUDA MONACO






















VA N U AT UAPPENDIX TABLE B
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF REGRESSION VARIABLES
(in $millions, except as noted)
Standard
Mean Deviation
Non-financial Income 508.1 (1354.1)
Financial Income -3.7 (289.0)
Total Income 504.4 (1355.0)
Tax Rate 0.31 (0.18)
Plant, Property & Equipment 1783 (5210)
Equity Investment 2677 (6373)
Net Equity 893.6 (2676.4)
Employee Compensation 1067 (2885)
Employment (thousands) 60.5 (142.0)
Population (millions) 27.1 (83.5)
GDP ($ billion) 76.1 (169.2)
GOP per capita ($) 4040 (41 44)A
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